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dimensions and challenges of their ‘independence’. IROs are specialist social workers whose function is to review
the cases of children in public care and ensure that they have appropriate plans and that these plans are being
implemented in a timely manner. IROs are ‘independent’ in the sense that they are not the social worker to
whom a child's case is allocated, and do not have line management responsibility for the case, however they
are employed by the same local authority. There are detailed regulations and government guidelines on their
role, and high expectations, but what does independence mean in this context? The paper draws on a mixed
methods study conducted by the authors in 2012–14, which included a survey of 122 ﬁles of children in care
from four local authorities; interviews with 54 social workers, 54 IROs, 15 parents, and 15 young people; six
focus groups; and nationally-distributed questionnaires for IROs (65), social work managers (46) and children's
guardians (39). The study found ﬁve dimensions of independence: professional, operational, perceived, institu-
tional and effective. The IROs and social workers generally took more nuanced and pragmatic approaches to
their inter-professional working than prescribed in the policy guidance or the pronouncements of politicians
and judges, seeing this as more likely to be effective. IROs are not, and cannot be, the solution to all the problems
that exist in services for children in care, and the other professionals involved should not be seen as necessarily
any less capable or committed to the best interests of the children. Rather, the IRO is part of an interactive system
of checks and balances which, together, may increase the likelihood that professional judgement will be
exercised effectively on the child's behalf.
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Managerialism1. Introduction
This paper considers the role of Independent Reviewing Ofﬁcers
(IROs), specialist social workers in England and Wales whose function
is to review the cases of children in public care and ensure that appro-
priate plans are in place and being implemented in a timely manner.
IROs are ‘independent’ in the sense that they are not the social worker
to whom a child's case is allocated, and do not have line management
responsibility for that social worker (a role that typically falls to yet an-
other social worker, the teammanager) although they are employed by
the same local authorities as these others. This means that there are (at
least) three social workers around any given child or young person in
carewith direct responsibility for, and a reasonable degree of familiarity
with, his or her case. The different roles of these professionals, and the
overlaps and tensions between them, are therefore of great conse-
quence for the well-being of the children and the effectiveness of the
plans made for them., j.dickens@uea.ac.uk
uea.ac.uk (G. Philip),
. This is an open access article underThe paper draws on ﬁndings of a research study of care planning and
the role of the IRO undertaken in 2012–14 (Dickens, Schoﬁeld, Beckett,
Philip, & Young, 2015), and focuses on the notion of independence in this
professional and organisational context. The government guidance for
IROs (DCSF, 2010), and indeed the name of the service, makes clear
that independence is central to this service's claim to make a distinct
contribution. The paper will examine what IROs' independence means
in practice.
While the focus of the paper is this one particular administrative ar-
rangement that exists within a single jurisdiction, the issues raised have
muchwider implications for the ongoingdebate in the literature onpro-
fessionalism about the correct balance to be struck between profession-
al discretion and professional accountability, and the role of quality
assurance mechanisms. We observe that the thinking behind the IRO
service is a curious hybrid of, on the one hand, the traditional discourse
of professionalism (IROs need to be independent of managerial control
in order that theymay be guided by their professional values and judge-
ment) and, on the other, the managerialist discourse that emphasises
the need for quality assurance mechanisms to ensure accountability
(social workers' professional values and professional judgement cannot
be relied upon, so their decisions need to be scrutinised).the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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2.1. The role of the IRO
It is a legal requirement in England andWales that each child in care
should have a named IRO, and IROs' duties are set out in primary legis-
lation, regulations and ‘statutory guidance’ (government guidance that
local authorities are required to follow unless there are exceptional cir-
cumstances to justify a variation). The guidance to local authorities on
their responsibilities for children in care is extensive (at the time of
writing, the most recent version is DfE, 2015), and there is a speciﬁc
handbook for IROs (DCSF, 2010). Their key tasks are tomonitor the per-
formance of the local authority in relation to the child's case, including
checking that the plan meets the child's needs, that it is viable and
that previous decisions have been carried out; to chair the periodic re-
views of the child's case; to meet with the child before each review
and ensure that his/her wishes and feelings are taken into consider-
ation; to ensure that the parents' wishes and feelings are taken into con-
sideration, and that all those involved in the reviewmeeting(s) are able
to make a meaningful contribution; to identify who is responsible for
implementing the decisions of each review, with timescales; and to
tackle any delays.
The role was created in 2004, largely in response to mistrust from
the courts about the compliance of local authorities with court-or-
dered care plans, and the lack of anyone to challenge local authorities
about their planning for the child if his/her parents were no longer
involved. These matters had come to a head in 2001, in a Court of Ap-
peal judgement which proposed that ‘starred milestones’ should be
identiﬁed in a child's care plan and procedures established for the
case to be referred back to court if these were not achieved (Re W
and B; Re W (Care Plan) [2001] EWCA Civ 757). The judgement was
subsequently overturned in the House of Lords, in March 2002, on
the basis that it breached the proper division of responsibilities be-
tween the courts and local authorities (Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Im-
plementation of Care Plan); Re W (Minors) (Care Order: Adequacy of
Care Plan) [2002] UKHL 10, [2002]). However, the judgement
stressed that the rejection of this step on legal grounds ‘must not ob-
scure the pressing need for the government to attend to the serious
practical and legal problems identiﬁed by the Court of Appeal’
(para 106). The role of the IRO was developed as a remedy to this
situation.
Two points about this particular narrative are worth bearing in
mind. First, a number of local authorities had already established spe-
cialist reviewing systems, so the role was not simply the result of
court-led pressure (Grimshaw & Sinclair, 1997); and second, research
at the time gave a rather different picture: that on the whole plans
were implemented successfully, and while there might sometimes be
delay or changes, this was not because of deliberate non-compliance
by local authorities, rather because of plans not working out for various
reasons, or changing circumstances (Hunt & Macleod, 1999; Harwin,
Owen, Locke, & Forrester, 2003).
Nevertheless, there are high expectations of the role, and doubts
about the effectiveness of the IRO service were being expressed
within a very short period of time (e.g. DfES, 2006). There has been
forceful criticism of IROs for being insufﬁciently challenging and in-
sufﬁciently ‘independent’. A leading example is the judgement in
the case of A and S v Lancashire County Council [2012] EWHC 1689
(Fam), when the judge awarded damages against the IRO personally
for failing to protect the interests of the two boys in the case. Other
examples are the thematic inspection by Ofsted (2013), and research
by the National Children's Bureau (NCB, 2014). But it is important to
lookmore carefully at the nature of ‘independence’ in a complex con-
text where other professionals are involved, other individuals, dif-
ferent agencies (including at times, the courts), public money is
being spent, activities and processes are highly regulated by national
and local policies, and resources are limited.2.2. Independence and the professions
Eliot Freidson notes that professions traditionally claim an entitle-
ment ‘to be independent of those who empower them legally and pro-
vide themwith their living’ (Freidson, 2001, p. 220). This claim is based
on their specialist knowledge, but crucially also on their ethical commit-
ment to some ‘transcendent value’ (2001, p. 122), such as Justice (in the
case of the legal profession), Health (the medical professions) or Truth
(the academy), which will guide them in the absence of external
control.
Such claims are sometimes made on behalf of the profession of
social work, although often ruefully. We may see them, for instance,
in the large body of writing (collectively referred to by Evans and
Harris (2004, p. 874) as ‘curtailment literature’) which charts the
rise of managerialism in social work and the curtailment of profes-
sional discretion that has supposedly resulted. Jones (1999, p. 38),
for instance, regrets that ‘social work has been transformed from a
self-regulating professional activity into a managed and externally
regulated set of tasks’; and Rogowski (2011, p. 162) complains that
rules and procedures ‘amount to an “iron cage” which limits practi-
tioner discretion’.
It seems self-evident to advocates of professional autonomy that a
profession's knowledge and values entitle it to a degree of freedom
from managerial control. However there is an alternative view of pro-
fessions which is that they are essentially self-interested, that their
claim to exclusive expertise exists in order to ‘limit entry and so raise
professional incomes’ (Travers, 2007, p. 44) and that the transcendent
values they purport to serve are a means of ‘persuading society to
grant the special status of autonomy’ (Freidson, 1970, p. 135). This
view of the professions is taken by critics on the right and left of the po-
litical spectrum. On the right, neoliberals perceive human beings as es-
sentially self-interested actors, which results in a suspicion the claims of
professionals and public serviceworkers to a disinterested commitment
to the greater good. This in turn leads to the use of market and/or man-
agerial mechanisms to prevent the professions from ‘obstructing neces-
sary change or engaging in exclusionary practices’ (Travers, 2007, p. 46).
Critics on the left observe thatmost professionals, including even so-
cial workers, are relatively privileged members of society and many,
also including social workers, are in a relationship of unequal power
with their service users. As Travers observes, ‘… it is agreed bymost lib-
eral commentators that, far from being altruistic, professions seek to in-
crease their own earning power by securing a monopoly on
accreditation’ (Travers, 2007, p. 43). You do not have to be a neoliberal,
in other words, to see that professional power can sometimes be
abused, or used in a self-interested way.
In short, there are two distinct discourses about professional inde-
pendence. One (we might call it the ‘knight in shining armour’ dis-
course) is that, in order to be able to serve some ‘transcendent value’
professionals should be allowed to exercise their own judgement freely.
The other (wewill call it the ‘managerialist’ discourse) is that the output
of professionals needs to be carefully regulated in order to prevent pro-
fessional self-interest getting in the way of optimal service delivery. As
is the case with most such binary oppositions, there is a great deal of
ground between these two extremes. Probably most people would
agree that some midway point between complete autonomy and rigid
regulation is desirable – but may well not agree exactly where.
The IRO service represents a rather special case in relation to this
continuum, as we will discuss shortly, but before doing so, there is one
further point that is important to make. If one accepts that, at least to
some degree, the ‘managerialist’ discourse is valid, a new layer of prob-
lems present themselves. AsMax Travers notes ‘since professionalwork
involves the exercise of situated judgement, it is impossible to devise a
means of objectively measuring performance’ (2007, p. 56) and this
leads directly to the paradox that to decidewhether or not a profession-
al has come to the correct judgement in a given situation is, of itself, ‘a
matter of professional judgement’ (2007, p. 56, emphasis added).
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The IRO service has a quality control function which is in some ways
akin to that of an inspectorate, albeit operating primarily at the detailed
‘micro’ level of individual cases, and operating within, rather than exter-
nally to, the organisationswhose activities it monitors. As noted in the in-
troduction, IROs are social workers, employed by the same authorities
who are responsible for children in care, whose function is to review
the plans made for those children, and the delivery of those plans, by
the children's social workers and the local authority in general. They are
not the supervisors of those social workers and do not have day-to-day
operational responsibility for the young people whose cases they review,
or for the services and resources provided to them– andyet, despite those
constraints, they have the extensive set of responsibilities outlined earlier.
One particularly interesting aspect of the IRO service is that the discourse
surrounding their role is a curious kind of hybrid of the ‘managerialist’ and
‘shining armour’ positions discussed above. By this we mean, not that it
occupies the middle ground between the two, but rather that it draws
on elements of discourses from opposite ends of the spectrum– something
which it has in commonwith the discourse surrounding thework of inde-
pendent inspectorates and watchdogs of various kinds such as the
Children's Commissioners in the UK. On the one hand, IROs exist to chal-
lenge the professional judgement – and therefore, by implication, the tra-
ditional claim to professional autonomy – of children's social workers and
social work managers. On the other hand, IROs (who are social workers
themselves) are speciﬁcally enjoined to be as ‘independent’ as possible
of any external pressure, so as to be ‘fearless champions’ of the best inter-
ests of children (Finlayson, cited by Lepper, 2015; see also Jackson, 2014,
who was the judge in the A and S v Lancashire case). In a sense, what is
taken away from one group of social workers is given to another group.
And indeed, much of the discourse about the role of IROs places responsi-
bilities upon IROswhich onemight otherwise have assumed to be the re-
sponsibility of those towhom the children's caseswere actually allocated.
In fact, commentators concerned to see control exercised over the
practice of local authorities and their managers, are often keen to give
even more independence to IROs than they already have, following the
logic of the IRO Handbook which states that ‘the independence of the
IRO is essential to enable him/her to effectively challenge poor practice’
(DCSF, 2010, para 2.18). As the National Children's Bureau noted, ‘there
has been continuing scepticism about whether they [IROs] are making
enoughdifference to thequality of the service andwhether their indepen-
dence is compromised by being under local authority control’ (NCB, 2014,
p. 6).
So, poor performance by local authority social workers and managers
necessitatesmore vigorous scrutiny and challenge, but poor performance
by IROs necessitates more independence! There is an interesting contra-
diction here. IROs come from the same pool of qualiﬁed social workers
as do social work managers and practising social workers, and the same
individual may at different points in her career play all three roles, and
yet they are sometimes assumed to possess different qualities, and to be
worthy of a different level of trust. This assumption can be found in a
House of Lords committee on the Children and Young Person's Bill in
2008, which included, amongst other things, provisions to extend the
role of IROs. In the committee, Lord Adonis observed:
The role of the IRO is central to ensuring that the voice of the child is
heard. Therefore, Clause 11 introduces a speciﬁc duty on the IRO to
ensure that thewishes and feelings of the child are given due consid-
eration in care planning…. The Bill extends the responsibilities of
IROs to monitor the performance of the local authority's functions
in relation to a child's case, ensuring that they effectively oversee
the care planning process so that it is fair and reasonable and gives
proper weight to the child's wishes and feelings…, ensuring that
there is greater scrutiny of the care plan for each child in care and
making sure that children and young people are informed about
their rights if they consider that they have been treated unfairly.(House of Lords, 17 Jan, 2008, column GC581).
Lord Adonis is very conﬁdent that this particular group of social
workers (IROs) will be able to ‘ensure’ that children are listened to –
the words ‘ensure’, ‘ensuring’ and ‘make sure’ between them appear
ﬁve times in this quotation. Yet the very existence of IROs is based on
a lack of conﬁdence that social workers can be trusted to ensure that
children's voices are adequately heard.
These contradictions are not offered here for ridicule. There is a gen-
uine paradox at the core of it, and paradoxes cannot be resolvedwithout
contradictions. What is interesting, and what the rest of this paper will
explore, is the way that the contradictions inherent in the role have
been worked out in practice by IROs and the other social workers in-
volved with looked after children.
3. Methodology
The research study on which this paper is based was funded by the
Economic and Social Research Council and used a mixed methods ap-
proach (Dickens et al, 2015). In summary, it involved:
• Analysis of case ﬁles of 122 looked after children, in four local author-
ities in England;
• In-depth interviews with 54 social workers, 54 IROs, 15 parents, and
15 young people;
• Two focus groups with young people who were or had been in care;
• A multi-professional focus group in each local authority;
• Nationally-distributed questionnaires for IROs (65 replies), social
work managers (46 replies) and children's guardians (39 replies).
The four local authorities were two large county councils, one uni-
tary authority (a small city) and one London borough. There were 30
case studies per authority (32 in the largest), randomly selected but
within parameters to ensure a range of legal statuses, ages and lengths
of time in care. The study had research ethics approval from the Re-
search Ethics Committee of the School of Social Work at the University
of East Anglia.
The social workers and IROs were selected from those involved in
these cases, drawing on the ﬁle analysis to ensure a balanced range of
cases and workers, and to avoid having more than two cases held by
any individual worker. The social worker and IRO were interviewed on
50 cases. There were a further six cases where either the social worker
or the IROwas interviewed. These interviews focused on getting further
information about the child's circumstances, the evolution of the care
plan and the current goals for the child. There were questions about
the roles that each professional had played in the care planning and re-
view process for the selected child, and alsowider questions about their
understanding of the care planning and review process in general, and
the role of the IRO.
The interviews with parents and young people focused on their ex-
periences of social work intervention, reviews and the role of the IRO.
The child and young person interviewees were nine boys and six girls.
The youngest was aged 10, and the eldest 17. The 15 parent interviews
were 13 mothers, one mother and father together, and one father.
All interviews were tape-recorded with the consent of the inter-
viewee, and transcribed. Theywere analysed using a thematic approach
(Boyatzis, 1998), looking for comparisons and contrasts between differ-
ent individuals and the different groups. Analysis was undertaken with
the aid of the NVivo computer software.
The composition of the professional focus groups varied from au-
thority to authority, but across all four focus groups a full range of rele-
vant professionals and others was included. Attendees included IROs
and IRO managers, specialist health and education workers for children
in care, local authority lawyers, children's guardians, residential care
staff and foster carers. The groups were asked to discuss their experi-
ences of care planning and review, and the role of the IRO. The focus
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recent care leavers, recruited through the two of the local authorities'
young people in care councils. The discussions in the focus groups
were recorded and transcribed, and analysed alongside the one-to-
one interviews.
The questionnaires were sent out nationally in order to gain a wider
range of perspectives, and to see whether the experiences within the
four study authorities were consistent with experiences elsewhere in
England. They were sent to IROs and to two groups of social workers
who were not interviewed, team managers of local authority looked
after children teams and children's guardians. Children's guardians are
social workers appointed by the court when a child is subject to care
proceedings, to make an independent assessment of the case. They are
not employed by local authorities but by a separate agency, the Children
and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, known as ‘Cafcass’.
The questionnaires were sent out to senior ofﬁcers in IRO services,
local authorities and Cafcass, with a request to forward them to relevant
staff. There were questions about their work experience, caseloads, ex-
periences of care planning and working with the other professional
groups, their role understandings and their perceptions of successes
and difﬁculties. A number of reminders were sent to the relevant agen-
cies over the period that the questionnairewas open. The authors donot
know howmany staff received thesemessages and is therefore not pos-
sible to calculate a response rate. However, there was at least one re-
sponse from 61 different authorities, 40% of the LAs in England. These
came from all regions of the country, and different types of authority
(county councils, inner and outer London authorities, metropolitan bor-
oughs, smaller and larger unitary authorities). The authors cannot claim
that the sample was representative in a statistical sense, but it is large
and varied enough to include a diverse range of views and perspectives
from across the country. The responses to the different questions were
analysed in NVivo or SPSS as appropriate. Sections 4, 5 and 6 below
present ﬁndings from the study.4. Characteristics of IROs
The questionnaire data showed the IRO service to be an experienced
workforce, consistent with the ﬁndings of other research (NCB, 2014).
Forty of the IROs responding to the questionnaire (62%) had more
than twenty years post-qualifying experience in total (previous posts
and current post combined). Forty had been IROs for ﬁve years or
more. Three-quarters of the IROs had experience of being a teamman-
ager (or other managerial post) prior to becoming an IRO. Just over
two-thirds of IROs (69%, 45 respondents) indicated that they had
worked in their current local authority in another post prior to taking
up their current post as an IRO. In the interviews, many IROs portrayed
this depth of experience and knowledge of an authority's systems and
personnel as an advantage, that they knew how things worked and
how to get things done; but, as will be discussed below, other inter-
viewees and questionnaire respondents, notably the children's guard-
ians, regarded this ‘insider’ status with suspicion, as being likely to
weaken the commitment to strong challenge.
One of themajor obstacles to IROs' effectiveness, identiﬁed in previ-
ous research (Ofsted, 2013; NCB, 2014) and in the A and S v Lancashire
case judgement, is excessive workloads. From our questionnaire data,
the mean case load for full-time IROs working solely as an IRO was 75,
which was just above the range recommended in the IRO Handbook
(50–70: DCSF, 2010, para. 7.15). However, this ﬁgure disguises consid-
erable variation. The range was from 43 to 119. There was some evi-
dence that the problem of heavy workloads was being addressed.
Nearly four in ten said that their caseload was lower than the year be-
fore (39%, 25 of those responding: seven were new employees so the
question was not relevant). Almost 30% (19) said that it was about the
same; but a ﬁfth of the respondents, (20%, 13) said that their caseload
was higher than it had been a year before.5. Independence
‘Independence’ is clearly key to the distinctiveness of the role of
IROs. As we have seen ‘independence’ is especially enjoined in the guid-
anceunderwhich IROs operate,while debates around the functioning of
IROs often centre on whether they are independent enough. But ‘inde-
pendence’ can mean many different things, and the analysis of inter-
view, focus group and questionnaire material revealed ﬁve distinct
ways in which the word, or the idea, was used by participants in the
present study.
5.1. Professional independence
This is the independence traditionally claimed by professionals, to
come to their own professional judgements on the basis of their profes-
sional expertise and of the ‘transcendent value’which they serve. In the
case of IROs, the ‘transcendent value’ frequently referred towas the best
interests of the child, or sometimes ‘the voice of the child’. On one of the
questionnaires an IRO said that he/shewanted to ‘meet upwith children
more frequently… to get to know them better so they can feel that their
IRO is a “champion” for them’.
One would assume that championing the best interests of the child
would also be a principle that would guide the work of all the profes-
sional social workers involved in work with children, and indeed an al-
located social worker described his/her responsibility in precisely these
terms – ‘I feel that… themajority of my role as a social worker is to def-
initely make sure that we can be the voice of the child’ (Social worker
interview). However the existence of the IRO role is based on a recogni-
tion that there are ‘other drivers’ (as one IRO put it) which can some-
times get in the way of professional independence. The most
frequentlymentioned such driverswere budgets, procedures andwork-
loads, the implication being that managers and social workers may
sometimes be so preoccupied with pressures on them to stay within
budget, manage workloads or meet targets, that their focus is in danger
of shifting towards the needs of the organisation, or even their own
needs, and away from the needs of individual children:
I think the difference for us is, you're not the caseworker, so you
aren't involved in all those tensions…. You're sort of up a bit, looking
down, you know, on all what's happening. So you're seeing all of it,
rather than just the bit that the social worker's got to deal with or
the teacher's got to deal with… and you actually can see how it's ei-
ther linking together, or it's not,with the child in themiddle. (IRO in-
terview).
5.2. Operational independence
We use the term ‘operational independence’ to refer to separation
from direct involvement in operational functions. This is the kind inde-
pendence referred towhen the IROHandbooknotes that the regulations
‘do not prescribe the position of the IRO within the local authority but
do prescribe minimum levels of independence’ (DCSF, 2010, para
2.18). Regulation 46 speciﬁes that the IRO must not have day to day re-
sponsibility for the young person (visits, making plans) andmust not be
involved in the allocation of resources.
‘Operational independence’ is quite different fromprofessional inde-
pendence, and it is possible to imagine someone who has either one of
them without the other. Professional independence is about being
trusted to pursue the best interests of the service user, while operational
independence is to do with not being directly involved in operational
decisions. However there is an implicit assumption in the regulations
about the relationship between the two: namely, that professional inde-
pendence may be compromised by operational engagement. A number
of IROs echoed this view: ‘I… can focus on the child's needs and not
what resources are available or other pressures,’ said one IRO. And in
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ability of IROs, with their relatively detached position in the organisa-
tion, to take a ‘helicopter view’ and ‘see thewood for the trees’ (both ex-
pressions that were used several times in this study, by IROs and by
others). As one social worker observed, IROs ‘do have sort of an outside
picture or sense of what is going on, so really they have a different view,
an overview’.
Operational independence in a pure form is, however, a difﬁcult and
even self-contradictory concept. The study found that IROs in practice
not infrequently took on roles which overlapped with those of the allo-
cated social worker (e.g., chasing up resources, or liaisingwith parents),
or the team manager (e.g., giving social workers advice on practice).
There was also a very wide range of views as to whether or not IROs
were involved in plan-making. Two social workers within the same au-
thority, for instance, expressed completely opposite views on this: one
seeing the reviewmeetings chaired by IROs as the primary plan-making
forum for children in care, the other saying that plans were always
made elsewhere, but were reviewed in the meetings. (In fact, even the
IRO Handbook is ambiguous on this point, with paragraph 2.18 stating
that the IRO should not be ‘a person involved in preparing the child's
care plan or the management of the child's case’ but paragraphs 3.70
and 3.71 talking about ‘decisions made at reviews’, and that these are
binding if not challenged by a senior manager within ﬁve days.)
In a sense, an effective IRO is inevitably involved in plan-making. If
IROs challenge plans and insist on changes to them, the result is a new
plan inwhich the IRO has at least some stake. So IROs are notwholly de-
tached from operational matters such as the making of plans, and in a
way they cannot be, if they are to be effective at all. Nevertheless, gen-
erally speaking, IROs in the present study were seen by themselves
and others as possessing a sufﬁcient level of detachment to be able to
take a distinctive view of their own. And, though there were some com-
plaints about IROs overturningdelicate plans or carefullyworked out ar-
rangements, this distinctive ‘outsider’ perspective was widely valued.
Operational independencemay be a complex and slightly contradictory
notion in relation to IROs, given that they are not inspectors coming in
occasionally to assess the overall quality of a service but have an ongo-
ing relationship with the speciﬁc children on their caseload, and an on-
going input into the plans that are made for them, but it is not a
meaningless one.5.3. Perceived independence
The extent to which IROs are perceived to be capable of acting inde-
pendently of the other social workers in the triangle is not the same
thing as whether they are independent in fact, but is nevertheless im-
portant to the establishment of a relationship of trust with all partici-
pants. An IRO who was in fact completely capable of coming to
independent conclusions from the rest of the local authority might
still seem to parents to be allied with the local authority, if he or she
was based in the same ofﬁce, was clearly on amicable terms with the
other social workers, and (as one would expect, given their similar
training and background) quite frequently agreed with them.
This was a concern expressed by several IROs and social workers, as
well as by some parents. One mother, for instance, said in an interview:
She [IRO] sides with Social Services… they are all very cliquey cliqu-
ey… They are all like sitting there laughing and joking as youwalk in,
and things like that…. [They] know each other well, they all work in
the same building… on the same ﬂoor.
This mother was unhappy that (as she saw it) the IRO failed to do
what she said she would, and linked this to her perception that the
IRO and the other social workers saw each other as colleagues and
friends. This is understandable, though the fact that an IRO in a given
case takes the same view as the other social workers is not in itself evi-
dence that IROs are not genuinely independent, and a number ofparents did recognise this. Asked her whether she thought the IRO
agreed with social services, another mother answered, ‘I think he did,
yeah, I think he did probably agree with social services… but it was
what was best for [the child].’ Another parent said she thought the
IRO was ‘on everyone's side; he was a little bit for us and a little bit for
the social worker, a big part for [the child] of course. I think he is trying
to do the best for [the child], yeah.’
5.4. Institutional independence
This would involve the complete separation of IROs from local au-
thorities and their employment by a separate organisation. This was a
live issue at the time the study was being carried out because the Chil-
dren and Young Persons Act 2008 made it possible for the Secretary of
State to impose such a separation on IROs by order made at any date
up to 13 November 2015. Since this deadline has now passed, the fol-
lowing discussion will not rehearse the debate about the desirability
or otherwise of institutional independence, but it is discussed in some
detail by Dickens et al (2015).
5.5. Effective independence
The four kinds of independence mentioned thus far can be summed
up as, ﬁrst, the degree to which IROs are free to exercise their own pro-
fessional judgement (professional independence); second, the degree
to which IROs are freed from responsibility for operational decisions
(operational independence); third, the extent to which they are seen
by others as being independent of the local authority (perceived inde-
pendence); and fourth, the idea of IROs being part of a separate organi-
sation to the local authority (institutional independence), which
currently does not apply. The study also found a ﬁfth aspect, ‘effective
independence’, without which other kinds of independence would be
of little value. This could be described as the ability to inﬂuence events.
It could be called ‘agency’, ‘effectiveness’ or ‘power’, and its relationship
to the other kinds of independence is complex.We shall discuss this fur-
ther in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, but ﬁrst say more about the inter-profes-
sional context within which IROs operate.
6. Inter-professional relationships and effectiveness
6.1. The social work triangle
As noted in the introduction, the existence of IROs means that each
child is at the centre of a triangle of social workers, each of whom has
particular responsibilities for them. The ﬁrst member of the triangle is
the child's allocated social worker, who in normal circumstances
would have the most contact with the child, and is responsible for
implementing the child's care plan, and responding on a day to day
basis to problems and queries. The second is the social worker's line
manager, to whom the social worker is accountable for his or her
workwith the child, andwithwhom the socialworkerwill typically dis-
cuss the child's case and develop plans. The line manager is likely to be
responsible for large number of cases, and must ensure that each child
receives an appropriate share of the limited resources of the agency.
The third is the IRO. If the case is subject to care proceedings, there
will also be a fourth social worker, the children's guardian, whose task
is to ensure that the child's best interests, and his/her wishes and feel-
ings, are adequately represented in the court arena. There may also be
other social workers involved, such as residential social workers, or fos-
tering social workers. However, assuming that posts are ﬁlled and cases
can be properly allocated, the core triangle is the basic arrangement for
all children in care.
The researcherswondered if therewould be evidence of conﬂicts be-
tween the three groups as towho is the true custodian of the child's best
interests, for, as Freidson observes, such tussles are not uncommon in
professional life: ‘Part of the struggle that can occur between
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which onemy legitimately claim custody of a traditional value’ (2001, p.
122).
IROs did sometimes present themselves as uniquely well-placed to
represent the voice of the child, particularly in situations where there
was a rapid turnover of social workers and IROs were a source of conti-
nuity.Many IROs referred to the fact that, due to frequent changes of so-
cial workers they were often ‘the one constant ﬁgure in [a child's] life’
(IRO questionnaire), although there were counter-instances where a
single social worker had dealt with a succession of IROs. There was
some evidence of conﬂicts and disagreements between the different
groups in the triangle – for example, one team manager wrote on the
questionnaire: ‘On occasion I have had concerns that the IRO is too in-
volved in formulating plans inappropriately, and I have been clear that
this is not their role as they are not theworker's teammanager’. Howev-
er, such comments were unusual, and on the whole allocated social
workers and team managers seemed to value the input of IROs, and
the perspective they brought to the case as a result of their semi-de-
tached status. As one social worker observed:
IROs seem to be far more visible outside reviews [than they used to
be], far more questioning, wanting far more updated information…
which is ﬁne for me, you know…. In fact, I often have meetings with
them… just to talk things over really, because they obviously know
the situation and the child… it's always good to have discussions
with the people not so involved, involved but not in the day-to-
day stuff….
IROs in turn were generally respectful of the unique position of the
allocated social worker:
Most young people know that if they raise things with me I will fol-
low them through and challenge others if necessary. However, they
also know that it is still important for them to engage with their so-
cial worker and address issues with them ﬁrst. Some social workers
also have an excellent relationshipwith the children theyworkwith
and are very proactive, but some don't. (IRO questionnaire).
6.2. Evidence of effectiveness
There is no simple measure that can be used to answer the question
as towhether or not IROs are effective, whether they ‘make a difference’.
If the testwaswhether or not IROs had been able to prevent every delay,
or immediately resolve every problem in planning or service delivery,
then the answer would be no, because the case ﬁle survey showed ex-
amples of delays and unresolved problems, sometimes stretching over
many reviews. However this would not be a reasonable test. There is
no reason to believe that an IRO should always be able to resolve difﬁ-
culties in a case which the current allocated social worker and team
manager have been unable to resolve, particularly when one bears in
mind that IROs are speciﬁcally excluded by the guidance from control
over resources. Managers were sometimes characterised by IROs as
being pre-occupied with managing resources, but, as noted above, a
manager, like the local authority as a whole, has responsibility for the
well-being not just of one child but of many, and resources allocated
to one child are inevitably resources taken away fromothers. This is pre-
sumably the reason that the IRO Handbook acknowledges that ‘that the
review cannot tie the hands of a local authority in relation to some is-
sues, particularly where there are resource implications’ (DCSF, 2010,
para 3.70).
A more realistic and appropriate test is to ask whether the input of
IROs can be seen to be providing added value, resulting in better out-
comes thanmight otherwise have been the case. Theﬁnding of the pres-
ent study is that the answer to this question is a qualiﬁed yes. Not every
interviewee or respondent would have agreed with this, and questions
were certainly raised by some participants, including social workers,teammanagers and parents, about the degree towhich IROswere really
able to inﬂuence events. Children's guardians, in particular, were likely
to express concerns about IROs failing to challenge local authorities suf-
ﬁciently. As a Cafcass manager (i.e. manager of children's guardians),
complained in one of the focus groups:
There are examples that you could ﬁnd that, where, you know –
years and years and years of not complyingwith a care plan – a local
authority care plan has just gone unchallenged….
However, against this, other views expressed in the interview and
questionnaire material showed social workers, managers, parents and
young people all acknowledging that IROs can and do intervene in
ways that helped to move things forward in a constructive direction
(see Dickens et al, 2015 for examples). The examination of the case
ﬁles did uncover delays, but also instances where IROs could be seen in-
terrogating plans and setting deadlines in reviews. (Though of course
we cannot know for certain what would have happened in the absence
of IROs, andwhether or not otherswould have stepped into the breach.)
Another factor in assessing effectiveness is individual variation. One
social worker, asked in the interview whether IROs had ‘clout within
your local authority… power to get things to change, to get teamman-
agers to act?’, responded that she thoughtmost of them did, and identi-
ﬁed a key factor in the effectiveness or otherwise of IROS – a factor that
had also been apparent to the researchers – as being the readiness and
ability to follow things up between reviews, rather than leave them
until the next one:
... some of them [IROs] actually keep a tab on the important decisions
that's beenmade, and so they actually either contact the socialwork-
er or themanager to ﬁnd out… some of them follow up on the time-
scales to see, if this action hasn't been done,whyhasn't it been done?
Some interviewees and questionnaire respondents suggested that
different authorities afforded IROs different levels of inﬂuence, but the
evidence on this was not conclusive. The point being made here is
that there were clearly differences within authorities. Just as teachers,
social workers, and other professionals vary considerably in skill, com-
mitment and overall quality of work, so, not surprisingly, do IROs. ‘The
personalities of the IROs sometimes make a difference to how effective
the IROs are perceived,’ one teammanager observed. But it is important
to note also that IROs inevitably have ‘other drivers’ too, and that the de-
gree to which IROs can pursue issues arising from their cases will de-
pend in part, just as it does for social workers and managers, on the
size of their workload, the quality of supervision they receive and
their own understanding of their role.
6.3. How IROs inﬂuence events
Insofar as IROs did have a positive impact on many children's cases,
the question arises as to how IROs achieve sufﬁcient authority to be able
to inﬂuence events. The data suggest that IROs adopt not just one but a
number of different strategies. The most obvious of these is formal chal-
lenge, although if this happens it is usually after (and part of) a process
of discussion and negotiation. Various formal mechanisms are available
to IROs who wish to challenge the plans being made for children, and
they had been used by most IROs responding to the questionnaire.
Over three-quarters, 76%, reported using their local dispute resolution
procedures at least once in the previous 12months. Themediannumber
of times they said they had done so was three. Over a third, 36%, had
taken independent legal advice at least once, and 19% had used a help
line run by Cafcass. These ﬁgures have to be seen in the context of the
IROs' caseloads. As noted, the average caseload was 75, so it is clear
that formal challenge is relatively infrequent.
Challenge does not have to be formal to be effective, however. In
French and Raven's taxonomy of power (French & Raven, 1959;
Raven, 1993) coercive power (the power to compel), is only one of a
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power, expert power and referent power, the latter being derived from
the respect of others, and the IRO Handbook says that formal challenge
should only be used as a last resort (DCSF, 2010, paras 3.5, 3.71, 5.8, 6.1,
6.10). Effective IROs were typically able to inﬂuence practice without
resorting to formal processes. One IRO's description of his preferred
way of working shows how he relied a great deal on his own personal
authority:
There were three different children that I had concerns about, so I
nipped upstairs to where the social workers are sitting, and had a
word with the teammanager about one of them. I had a word with
another team manager about another one. Now, I know those con-
versations are going to make a difference, because these people are
going to get back to me today, and if they don't, I'll be chasing them
again. (IRO interview).
The less confrontational approaches included setting timeframes
for tasks and following up on them, raising concerns informally with
social workers and teammanagers, and then, if necessary, going into
the various systems of lower-level warnings known as ‘practice
alerts’, or ‘case alerts’ in different local authorities. In the interviews,
many social workers spoke of IROs as powerful and authoritative ﬁg-
ures whose views could not be disregarded, whether or not they
used formal or informal approaches. Social workers might ﬁnd this
uncomfortable, but in general they acknowledged its utility. As one
social worker put it:
Even though they are working for the local authority, they still come
down on you like a ton of bricks if certain things haven't been done.
And also, because they are part of the organisation, they are aware of
the issues… they are easily accessible to us, you know.
This last point is signiﬁcant because, although the thinking un-
derlying the IRO guidelines seems generally to be based on the as-
sumption that operational independence is essential, many IROs
seemed in practice to gain authority and inﬂuence, not by adopting
a position of detachment from operational matters, but, on the con-
trary, by getting involved, albeit in a selective and perhaps tactical
way. As previously noted, IROs sometimes became quite actively in-
volved in resolving problems in ways that one would normally asso-
ciate with allocated social workers, and often IROs' interventions
took the form, not of overt challenge, but of something more akin
to helpful advice. As one IRO observed about the working relation-
ship with team managers: ‘… it is about using your whole skill base
to engage that team manager and try to help them understand that
actually you are being helpful and not trying to be difﬁcult’.
As this last remark illustrates, the business of gaining inﬂuence was
often about relationship building, which might well include IROs dem-
onstrating that they understand the difﬁculties that the people they
are trying to inﬂuence are up against. So, just as authoritative social
work practice does not preclude empathy or supportiveness, effective
oversight by IROs did not, in practice, preclude positive working rela-
tionships and direct engagementwith operational staff. Some IROswor-
ried that theywere too sympathetic to the problems of operational staff,
but given that many delays are the result of resource shortfalls and
organisational problemsoverwhich IROs havenodirect control (and in-
deed, as we have noted, are explicitly excluded from controlling by the
Handbook), and which may be beyond the power of the social workers
and their managers to rectify (except, perhaps, to the cost of other,
equally needy children), IROs must walk a difﬁcult line. On the one
hand, they need to be careful not to simply accept every explanation
for shortcomings at face value. On the other hand, by showing willing-
ness to recognise the realities with which operational staff struggle,
IROs may be able maintain relationships of trust and respect, thereby
providing leverage that they might lose with an overly confrontational
approach.Further evidence of the negotiated approach generally adopted by
IROs is the low number of formal referrals to Cafcass made by IROs
(just ten up to February 2015), this being the mechanism of last resort
for IROs unable to reach agreement with the rest of the local authority
about the way forward on a case. While this could in some instances
be seen as failure to exercise authority appropriately, it could also be
seen as a measure of success. An analogy would be with going to court
(see for instance Hawkins, 2002). The fact that lawyers tend to avoid
taking cases to court wherever possible is actually an important part
of how the law works, bringing about change through negotiation and
mediation under the threat of legal action. In the sameway, the possibil-
ity of a referralmay be all that is needed for IROs to open upnegotiations
and get an agreement that actually averts the necessity for referral itself.
As one IRO observed:
Before an IRO gets to challenge at Cafcass level, there's a lot of hoops
to be jumped through. So initially you go to the social worker and
try, just on that level, to iron out any problems; teammanager; then
you'd be involvingmymanager, then you'd be getting involvedwith,
probably, service managers, potentially assistant directors.7. Discussion: professional independence and effectiveness
The importance of effective care planning, and timely implementa-
tion of plans, for children in care has long been recognised (e.g., see
Grimshaw & Sinclair, 1997). The statutory role of IROs was created in
order to address the courts' misgivings about local authority shortcom-
ings in this area and lack of a legal remedy. In fact, research then and
now shows generally positive outcomes for children in care (see
Forrester, Goodman, Cocker, Binnie, & Jensch, 2009; Children's
Commissioner for England, 2015), but there is no doubt that some
cases do not go well. There may be multiple and complex reasons for
poor outcomes, but implicit in the rationale for the creation of IROs
was a diagnosis that poor performance by local authorities in
implementing care plans was down to allocated social workers and
their managers not being sufﬁciently focused on the needs of the chil-
dren, not strong enough champions, too easily distracted by
organisational matters such as budgets, procedures and workloads.
The response was the creation of a new group of social workers, who
would stand to one side of the organisational hierarchy, and oversee
the judgements and decisions made by allocated social workers and
managers.
In practice, the idea that one must be removed from operational
matters to be able to work in the best interests of children or ensure
that children's voice is heard, is fraught with difﬁculties. As discussed
above, an IRO who is effective – who makes a difference to the lives of
children – is inevitably operationally engaged (hence the confusion
that is apparent, both in the guidance and in the comments made by
professionals in the present study, as to whether or not IROs make
plans). What is more, in order to be effective, an IRO must win the re-
spect of those whose job it is to put plans into practice, and this, as we
have seen, may involve IROs in engaging to some extent in tasks that
would strictly fall outside their brief, or in recognising the practical con-
straints faced by the other social workers in the triangle and accepting
compromises.
While to some this may seem a dilution of the independence of the
IRO, this study has shown that independence is a multi-dimensional
concept, and it does not follow in a straightforward way that a profes-
sional who possesses ‘independence’ in one sense of the word will nec-
essarily be able, or want, to exercise independence in other senses.
Some sacriﬁce of operational independence might be necessary in the
interests of increasing effective independence. And it is important too
that professional independence and professional judgement should
not be seen as the exclusive possession of any one group of social
workers. The values which social work traditionally claims to uphold
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or marginalised groups (in this case, children). If any one group were to
claim exclusive ownership of this role, this would amount, in effect, to
an implicit message to the others that championing the child was not
something that theywere expected to do. Travers (2007, p. 13) observes
that the advocates of Total Quality Management, an idea which lies be-
hind much of current quality assurance practice, were opposed, for this
reason, to the quality assurance function being separated from the rest
of an organisation. It would be in no one's interests, for instance, if allo-
cated socialworkerswere to conclude that hearing and representing the
voice of the child was someone else's job.
We noted earlier that the discourse underpinning the IRO role is a
strange hybrid in that it simultaneously rejects and endorses the tradi-
tional notion of the autonomous professional, but it is not really tenable
to believe simultaneously that one group of social workers can be fear-
less and impartial champions whose independence should be guaran-
teed, while another group are so compromised by their operational
role as to require their autonomy to be curtailed by close oversight
and challenge. In fact to hold two beliefs simultaneously would be rem-
iniscent of psychological ‘splitting’ in the sense that the term is used in
psychodynamic psychology (see, for instance, Hinshelwood, 2002, pp.
204ff). Melanie Klein postulated that infants ﬁnd the idea unbearable
that their mother, on whom they are so utterly reliant, is not perfectly
responsive to all their wants and needs, even though, in reality, she of
course is not, and so they deal with this by effectively splitting her
into two, the ‘good mother’ and the ‘bad mother’ (Klein, 1975 [1952],
p. 49). Some of the hopes that are projected onto IROs reﬂect a similar
kind of splitting between the ‘good social worker’ (the unfettered ‘fear-
less champion’ of the child) and the ‘bad social worker’ (preoccupied
only with following procedures, managing workloads and keeping
within budget). The present researchers did occasionally encounter di-
chotomous thinking of this kind, but it was not the view that was gen-
erally presented by any participant group in this study, including
parents and young people; rather, it seems to be an expectation more
likely held by outside observers, such as politicians and judges. The in-
teractions described to the researchers by IROs, social workers, social
work managers, children, young people and parents, were much more
complex and nuanced. In particular, while the three corners of the
core social work triangle – allocated social workers, managers and
IROs – were certainly not uncritical of one another, they did not (on
the whole) make exclusive claims to the moral high ground. Rather
they usually saw themselves, and were seen by parents and children,
as having distinct but complementary roles. The IROs' more speciﬁc
focus on ensuring plans were in place and properly implemented was
generally valued by social workers as helpful, rather than as a challenge
to their own professionalism. This may be considered an achievement
on the part of the IROs, although the fact that some were perceived as
being more effective than others is a reminder that professional effec-
tiveness is not something that can be simply guaranteed by one's posi-
tion in the organisation. Rather, it is to some degree always going to be
contingent on the skills, energy and commitment of the individual
professional.
8. Conclusion
The ﬁndings of this study provide an intriguing example of the way
that professional ‘independence’ actually works itself out when the
idealised world of policy encounters the messy and contradictory
world of everyday practice. IROswere in somewaysmore intervention-
ist than envisaged in the guidance, although less likely to use formal
procedures to challenge plans or delays than some commentators had
envisaged. It was evident that they were intervening in many cases to
ensure that plans were made and implemented, and that children's
wishes were properly attended to, but the level of intervention varied.
It did sometimes appear that more forceful involvement was required,
but changes were not always necessary, and discussion and advicewas usually able to help achieve those that were. The IROs' ‘helicopter
view’was, on the whole, valued and respected, as was the personal au-
thority of many IROs, but respect waswon asmuch by engagement and
willingness to help, as by preserving a stance of strict ‘independence’.
IROs took different views of their role butmost of them used the discre-
tion available to them to negotiate their own pragmatic approach, strik-
ing a balance between challenge and supportive engagement that
enabled them on the whole to perform a useful role, alongside their
other social work colleagues. This process of translating legislation and
policy into something that is workable in practice is very much in the
tradition of ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980; Evans, 2010).
What has emerged in practicemay not be quite what was envisaged
when the role was proposed, but despite that may be considered a pos-
itive outcome for the child care planning system, in that the IRO is not an
aloof ﬁgure looking in from outside, but rather is part of a team around
the child which, by and large, sees itself as working together towards
the same goal. Greater recognition of this grounded reality may be the
key to ensuring the greater effectiveness of the IRO service. IROs are
not, and cannot be, the solution to all the problems that exist in the ser-
vice for children in care, and the other social workers involved should
not be seen as necessarily any less capable or committed to the best in-
terests of the children. The triangle around the child of social worker,
manager and IRO cannot guarantee that child a worker who is truly an
independent professional (whatever the institutional arrangements,
all are bound to be members of complex organisations, with multiple
accountabilities), but the interactive system of checks and balances
which it entailsmay increase the likelihood that professional judgement
will be exercised effectively on the child's behalf.
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